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WHEN THE EYES AND EARS BECOME AN ARM OF THE 
STATE: THE DANGER OF PRIVATIZATION THROUGH 
GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF INSULAR RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
ABSTRACT 
The Shomrim, Hebrew for “guards,” operate as an ancillary police force 
in Hasidic communities. Defined by devout adherence to traditional norms, 
Hasidic Jews confine themselves to insular communities within America. 
However, like many insular or inherently religious communities, they appear 
to have a propensity to discriminate against outsiders in their attempts at 
seclusion. Although the Shomrim hold themselves out as their community’s 
primary police force, they frequently commit bias crimes and other 
discriminatory acts. This Comment advances the novel argument that the 
Shomrim are state actors and that government funding to the Shomrim may 
also violate the Establishment Clause. The Shomrim receive substantial 
government funding, maintain close ties and connections with the police and 
the state, and perform a public function. Because these connections constitute 
a “close nexus,” the Shomrim’s actions are fairly attributable to the state. As 
state actors, the Shomrim would be subject to constitutional limitations and 
prohibited from discriminating against outsiders. However, remedying this 
attribution of state action implicates additional constitutional problems. This 
Comment proposes that under current state action doctrine and Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, the only permissible solution in this context is to remove 
government ties and funding. 
Using the Shomrim as a case study, this Comment addresses the problem of 
privatization through government funding of insular religious communities and 
organizations. The Shomrim demonstrate that when the government funds 
inherently religious providers of social services, a constitutional gray area is 
created in the attempts to reconcile state action with the Establishment Clause. 
This Comment asserts the government should be careful in funding inherently 
religious providers of social services because such providers increase the 
likelihood of discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a predominantly Jewish area in 2010, an African-American teen was 
beaten with a radio and told “[y]ou don’t belong around here” just blocks away 
from his own neighborhood.1 Nearly a decade earlier, men in navy blue 
uniforms2 struck a group of Hispanic girls with umbrellas and sprayed them 
with a chemical substance.3 In another Jewish area, men driving patrol cars 
struck an African-American male with a baton and sprayed him with mace.4 
Ten years before, a group of West Indian teens were pursued and run off the 
road by a man shouting racial slurs.5 
Unifying these attacks are the perpetrators—men who wear navy blue, 
police-style uniforms and drive blue and white patrol cars.6 Often confused 
with the police, they are not police but the Shomrim—licensed citizen patrol 
groups found in many Hasidic7 communities across the United States.8 Reports 
are replete with accusations against the Shomrim of targeting blacks and 
committing other bias crimes.9 Articles frequently cite minority community 
members who have been stopped simply for not looking like the Hasidic Jews 
the Shomrim aim to protect.10 Even more of these crimes likely go unreported. 
 
 1 See Daniel Burke, Volunteer Unit Accused of Racism, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2011, at B2 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 2 Corey Kilgannon, In Protecting Hasidic Neighborhoods, Squads Patrol Without Guns or Badges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at A14 (noting the Shomrim “wore blue jackets with emblems . . . [and displayed] 
forelocks of the Hasidic”).  
 3 Anna Schneider-Mayerson, Hispanic Activists Want Shomrim Disbanded, N.Y. SUN, May 10, 2002, at 
1.  
 4 See Alex Mindlin, Patrolling the Streets, and Dissing the Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at CY6.  
 5 Driver Is Accused of Chasing Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1997, at 27.  
 6 See MATTHEW SHAER, AMONG RIGHTEOUS MEN: A TALE OF VIGILANTES AND VINDICATION IN 
HASIDIC CROWN HEIGHTS 27 (2012); see also supra notes 1–5; cf. SHAER, supra, at 13 (entering a room, one 
man “saw seven men in navy blue uniforms and thought, Police”).  
 7 Hasidic Jews represent a sect of extremely religious, mystical Orthodox Judaism. Within the Hasidism 
are different sects with particular views and specific norms and dress (e.g., Satmar, Bobovich, and Lubodovich 
Hasidim). Although they tend to live and work within their own groups, they interact substantially with one 
another. This Comment refers to the various Hasidic sects collectively. See Joseph Berger, Killing Rattles a 
Jewish Community’s Long-Held Trust of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A1. See generally Hasidism, 
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (Charles H. Lippy & Peter W. Williams eds., 2010), available at 
http://library.cqpress.com/era/encyra_943.1. 
 8 Nick Pinto, Gotham’s Crusaders, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 7, 2011, at 9. 
 9 See, e.g., Karen Matthews, Orthodox Communities Rely on Patrols for Safety, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
July 16, 2011, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-07-16-brooklyn-boy-volunteer-
patrol_n.htm (“[C]ritics have accused some of being vigilantes who target blacks.”). 
 10 See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Hasidic Patrol Group Faces Questions After a Crown Heights Clash, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at 21 (noting that members of the Shomrim randomly stop black pedestrians to ask 
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Although the Shomrim work with and act like the police and receive 
funding primarily from direct government grants, they are not held liable in the 
same way as ordinary police officers. Because they are assumed to be private 
actors, constitutional provisions protecting individual rights do not apply.11 
This Comment addresses the problem of privatization and government 
funding of insular religious communities and organizations, using the Shomrim 
in Brooklyn, New York as a case study. Although the Shomrim may seem 
unique in many respects, they are a salient example of government funding of 
religious social service providers. The Shomrim emphasize an important and 
interesting intersection of the privatization of government power and 
government funding of insular religious organizations and social service 
providers. 
Contention and debate surround the funding of religious groups, 
particularly with the tremendous amount of money funneled to religious 
organizations through charitable choice and faith-based initiatives.12 On the 
one hand, religious organizations are often considered the most effective 
providers of social services.13 On the other hand, there are many problems 
associated with funding religious organizations, including the potential for 
discrimination, a lack of religious autonomy, and the tension between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.14 
The debate is further compounded by the propensity for inherently religious 
or insular groups, such as the Shomrim, to discriminate against outsiders. The 
provision of government funds to these groups should be suspect due to the 
“significant pressure on those institutions to discriminate . . . [to] fulfill their 
broad religious mandates.”15 This is especially concerning because of the 
potential for religious entities to use government funding to further partisan 
political ends, promising votes for money.16 While a religious group’s 
 
why they are in the neighborhood to make outsiders feel unwanted); Pamela Newkirk, Ice Slowly Thawing 
Ethnic Tension Seen Lessening, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 28, 1991, at 1.  
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)). 
 12 See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2005) (identifying the partnership between religious entities and government agencies and 
describing the constitutional challenges such partnerships present). 
 13 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 353 (2009).  
 14 See generally Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12.  
 15 David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1366 (2003).  
 16 See id. at 1364–65.  
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proclivity to discriminate is normally discussed in the terms of religious 
discrimination, the issue of discrimination against outsiders is significant and 
unfortunately given little attention. 
The question is whether these providers, who have been providing social 
services for years, should now be able to “benefit from the government’s 
desire” for privatization.17 There is some concern about whether there are 
certain areas that are so “governmental,” such as punishment, that they should 
not be privatized.18 This question of government privatization using religious 
social service providers “has significant constitutional implications for 
religious entities, which have rarely, if ever, been litigated.”19 
In an age of increasing privatization and judicial deference to 
administrative decisions,20 decisions regarding the regulations that create semi-
private actors may be immune from review.21 Privatization poses the additional 
danger that “private actors will exploit their position in government programs 
to advance their own financial or partisan interests at the expense of program 
participants and the public.”22 This concern is striking in the context of 
religious organizations that choose to insulate to keep to themselves. The 
Shomrim highlight this concern as a government attempt to privatize a 
religious social service provider. 
This Comment advances the novel argument that the Shomrim are state 
actors and may present an Establishment Clause problem. Because the 
Shomrim, like other private actors, are not held to the confines provided under 
the Constitution, the victims of discrimination at the hands of religious social 
service providers are left with little recourse. Even more concerning, in the 
face of accusations of racial discrimination and violence the Shomrim are said 
to receive large amounts of public funding from politicians in order to buy 
their votes. 
 
 17 Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229, 1240 (2003).  
 18 See Saperstein, supra note 15, at 1383 (responding to Martha Minow’s statement).  
 19 Id.  
 20 Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 362, 364–65 (2008); see also Hadar Aviram et al., Moving Targets: Placing the Good Faith 
Doctrine in the Context of Fragmented Policing, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 727 (2010).  
 21 See Aviram et al., supra note 20, at 727.  
 22 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2003).  
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Due to the self-imposed insulation of the Hasidic community, it is 
unsurprising no one previously has written about the Shomrim. However, in 
the aftermath of more publicized discriminatory actions, as well as a young 
boy’s murder,23 the media has paid increasing attention to some of the ongoing 
tensions and problems posed by the Shomrim.24 While the Hasidic community 
generally avoids the American legal system,25 one case currently pending 
presses Hasidic patrol groups and the State to be held to greater liability for 
their actions.26 
In Part I, this Comment describes the Shomrim and their role in the Hasidic 
community, and it explains the Shomrim’s relationship, similarities, and ties to 
the police and state. Part I then explores criticisms of the Shomrim and 
addresses the legal issues they present. Part II considers the Shomrim in a 
religious context, suggesting the government’s interactions with the Shomrim 
may violate the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause bars 
excessive funding or non-neutral delegation to the Shomrim, but it cannot stop 
the Shomrim in their discriminatory actions. 
Part III advances the argument that the Shomrim are state actors and are 
subject to constitutional limitations because they perform a public function and 
maintain a close nexus with the state. The discriminatory nature of the 
Shomrim’s conduct also renders a finding of state action more likely. A state 
action argument would regulate the Shomrim as to constitutional limitations, 
giving the Shomrim or the government a problematic choice—regulation 
according to the Constitution, thus limiting their ability to keep out outsiders, 
or disentanglement and a halt to funding and ties with the state. Analysis under 
both the state action doctrine and the Establishment Clause provides an 
important view of the constitutional boundaries confronted when working with 
insular religious organizations.27 Further, in this age of privatization where the 
lines between public and private are increasingly blurred, “the contours of the 
 
 23 See Berger, supra note 7. 
 24 See infra Part I.  
 25 The Hasidim also avoid secular courts, “which they view as less than perfectly attuned to their 
interests,” because Jewish law (halacha) calls on Jews to go through beis din, or rabbinical arbitration, first. 
SHAER, supra note 6, at 3.  
 26 See Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Crown Heights Shomrim Volunteer Safety 
Patrol, Inc. v. City of N.Y., No. 11 CV 0329 (KAM)(JMA) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2011).  
 27 Although there is some criticism of whether the Establishment Clause and the state action doctrine 
should overlap, the intricacy of the relationship between the two doctrines is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. For a more in-depth discussion, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 12.  
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state action doctrine may come to define the contours of our most basic 
constitutional rights.”28 
Part IV assesses possible solutions to the constitutional issues implicated 
by the Shomrim and asserts that disentanglement and defunding are the only 
constitutionally permissible solutions. The inclination of an insular community 
to discriminate against outsiders to maintain its insularity highlights the danger 
of government allocation of funds and close ties to religious social services. 
Finally, this Comment concludes by asserting that the government should be 
careful in its relationships with insular communities. 
I. THE SHOMRIM: THE “EYES AND EARS” BECOME AN ARM OF THE STATE 
This Part first depicts the Shomrim and their relationship to the Hasidic 
community, and then it explains the relationship between the Shomrim and the 
police. Second, this Part focuses on frequent criticisms of the Shomrim, and it 
concludes by highlighting the legal issues pertaining to the Shomrim. 
A. The Shomrim and the Hasidic Community 
The Shomrim exist for two primary reasons: (1) to act as a police force “to 
protect against criminality,” and (2) to protect the Hasidic community’s way of 
life, “erect[ing] a human barrier between the Jewish settlement and the bustle 
of the world outside city limits.”29 Shomrim organizations exist wherever large 
Hasidic communities are located.30 While different Hasidic communities each 
have their own group,31 this Comment refers to the Shomrim of Brooklyn in a 
general sense because of their similarity and unified work. 
In Brooklyn, Hasidic communities live in an enclosed, closeted world that 
“foster[s] a sense of community, solidarity, and intimacy.”32 Known for their 
strict adherence to traditional Jewish law and custom,33 the Hasidic sects in 
 
 28 Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 
1250 (2010) (citing Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth 
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 85 (2004)).  
 29 SHAER, supra note 6, at 2 (emphasis omitted).  
 30 Matthew Shaer, A Shtetl Divided: Messianic Vigilantes, Brawling Hasidim, and the Battle for Jewish 
Brooklyn, HARPER’S MAG., Jan. 2011, at 53, 54. 
 31 E.g., Flatbush Shomrim, Crown Heights Shomrim, Crown Heights Shmira, Williamsburg Shomrim, 
Borough Park Shomrim, and Kings County Shomrim. 
 32 SHAER, supra note 6, at 8.  
 33 Shaer, supra note 30, at 54 (“Their lives are circumscribed by prayer, study, familial obligation, and a 
deep commitment to their Rebbe, or grand rabbi, who is considered closer to God than are other mortal men.”).  
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Brooklyn are considered a “textbook example of a ‘discrete and insular 
minority.’”34 The sanctity of their religion is omnipresent in the Hasidic Jews’ 
eyes, and all aspects of life are ordered in accordance with the direction and 
authority of their Rebbe, the grand or head rabbi.35 Therefore, it is unsurprising 
that the Shomrim both promote and patrol the barrier between the larger city 
and their religiously mandated life. 
In an emergency, the Shomrim are the Hasidim’s36 first line of defense.37 
The Shomrim are the preferred police because they know the territory, are 
trusted by their insular community,38 and are able to speak Yiddish, their 
community’s primary language.39 Even the police utilize the Shomrim as a 
liaison in the community.40 The New York Police Department (NYPD) 
considers the Shomrim its “eyes and ears,” relying on them to go beyond the 
NYPD’s normal reach.41 
B. The Shomrim Act like the Police and Are Intricately Tied to the Police 
Composed of Jewish volunteers, the Shomrim function similarly to an 
auxiliary police force.42 Although the Shomrim began many years ago as a few 
individual volunteers, the organization has matured into a government-funded 
supplement to the NYPD.43 But the Shomrim are no ordinary citizen patrol or 
neighborhood watch group—they follow suspects, trap perpetrators,44 
 
 34 T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines 
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 596 (1993) (referring to the Hasidim in Brooklyn regarding United 
Jewish Organizations v. Carey).  
 35 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 229. 
 36 Hasidim, meaning “pious one,” refers to the Hasidic Jewish people.  
 37 Kilgannon, supra note 2 (“Many area residents are more likely to call the patrol’s hot line number than 
911.”).  
 38 The Hasidic community is frequently untrusting of outsiders. See id. 
 39 Corey Kilgannon, For Hasidim, First Call for Help Often Isn’t to 911, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (July 
15, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/15/in-hasidic-areas-first-call-for-help-isnt-to-
911. 
 40 Jordan Heller, Jewish Street Patrols Curb Crime—and Generate Controversy, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 11, 2009, at 25.  
 41 Kilgannon, supra note 2. Additionally, the Shomrim have come in conflict with the NYPD as well as 
the community they aim to protect. See SHAER, supra note 6, at 3. 
 42 Pinto, supra note 8, at 10. Some Shomrim members are NYPD auxiliary force members, and some 
participate in the COP program (Community Oriented Policing). SHAER, supra note 6, at 73, 165.  
 43 See Pinto, supra note 8, at 12. 
 44 Kilgannon, supra note 2. 
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encounter dangerous situations,45 and “rule the streets like real cops—driving 
unmarked cars, flashing emergency lights and snatching people they think are 
criminals.”46 The Shomrim also maintain twenty-four-hour hotlines and 
dispatch stations.47 Fiercely proud of their work, the Shomrim post pictures of 
their arrests with the NYPD and their aid in collecting crime-scene evidence on 
neighborhood websites and the Shomrim Facebook pages.48 Even critics admit 
that while the patrols have their flaws, the Shomrim provide a beneficial 
service to the community at large.49 
The Shomrim bear a striking resemblance to the NYPD. Listening to police 
scanners, the Shomrim cruise the neighborhood50 and carry radios to keep in 
touch with one another.51 Members wear blue jackets with emblems 
resembling the NYPD logos, rope off areas with yellow crime-scene tape,52 
and drive blue and white patrol cars with “official emblems,”53 lights, and 
sirens.54 The patrol cars55 look exactly like the NYPD patrol cars; from the 




 45 For example, in 2010 four Shomrim members were shot after pursuing and confronting a known 
perpetrator. Anahad O’Connor & Mick Meenan, Man Shoots Four Members of Jewish Patrol in Brooklyn, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, at A16. 
 46 Simone Weichselbaum, Praise & Scorn for Hasidic Patrols. Some Say They Target Minorities, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, July 5, 2011, at 3. 
 47 Heller, supra note 40.  
 48 See, e.g., CrownHeights Shomrim, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/crownheights.shomrim (last 
visited June 18, 2013); YESHIVA WORLD NEWS, http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/local/nyc (last visited June 
18, 2013).  
 49 Heller, supra note 40.  
 50 Weichselbaum, supra note 46.  
 51 Kilgannon, supra note 39. 
 52 The Shomrim use yellow crime scene tape labeled “shomrim.” Kilgannon, supra note 2. 
 53 See id.; see also infra note 57. 
 54 See infra notes 57–58. The Shomrim even have the same “courtesy, professionalism, respect” emblem 
that the NYPD has on its patrol cars. See id. 
 55 The Shomrim also maintain legions of scooters similar to those used by the NYPD and command 
centers that also mimic NYPD command centers. Compare Photos: Shomrim Roll Out New Vehicle Design, 
CROWNHEIGHTS.INFO (May 12, 2010), https://crownheights.info/picture-of-the-day/26270/photos-shomrim-
roll-out-new-vehicle-design/ (picturing Shomrim patrol cars marked the same way as NYPD older design 
scooters), with Picture of the Day—The Police Response to Carjacking, CROWNHEIGHTS.INFO (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://crownheights.info/picture-of-the-day/32393/picture-of-the-day-the-police-response-to-carjacking/.  
 56 See infra notes 57–58. The only discernible difference in the two cars is that the NYPD emblem is 
replaced with either “SHOMRIM” or an acronym representing the particular neighborhood patrol. 
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A Shomrim Patrol Car57: 
 
An NYPD Patrol Car58: 
Similar to undercover police, the Shomrim utilize unmarked cars to tail 
suspected wrongdoers in matters requiring more stealth.59 The Shomrim also 
use police-style red rotating lights.60 These flashing lights are most likely an 
attempt to assert the Shomrim’s authority.61 
The NYPD maintains a close relationship62 with the Shomrim and relies on 
them for much of the police work done in the Hasidic communities. The 
 
 57 Shomrim Put Out First Marked Patrol Car, CROWNHEIGHTS.INFO (Oct. 3, 2006), http://crownheights. 
info/general/3271/shomrim-put-out-first-marked-patrol-car/. CHVP stands for Crown Heights Volunteer 
Patrol, a Shomrim patrol in Brooklyn.  
 58 POLICE CAR WEB SITE, http://policecarwebsite.net/fc/ny/nypd/nypd567.jpg (last visited June 18, 
2013).  
 59 O’Connor & Meenan, supra note 45. 
 60 Weichselbaum, supra note 46. However, reports assert that their use of the “red-and-blue backlight 
package” is illegal. Id.  
 61 The fact that the police have not stopped the Shomrim’s use of the lights may indicate their de facto 
allowance. See infra Part III.  
 62 See, e.g., Shomrim – שומרים, Levaya of Leiby Kletzky HY”D, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ 
media/set/?set=a.226042130772432.53081.162855353757777&type=1 (last visited June 18, 2013) (showing 
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manpower of the Shomrim “allows the police to go further in their search,” 
adding value and efficiency to the understaffed and overworked NYPD.63 
Some Shomrim members work directly with the police, and many receive or 
undergo training with the NYPD.64 Like the police, they are subjected to 
background checks and are fingerprinted.65 In 2009, one group even received 
space to work in the squad room of the Seventy-First Precinct House.66 They 
received “keys to several city vehicles . . . caps and uniforms, and badges,” 
becoming members of the Civilian Observation Patrol and reporting to the 
community affairs desk.67 Some members are also members of the NYPD 
auxiliary force.68 
C. Funding of the Shomrim and Ties to the State 
In addition to the close ties with the police department, the Shomrim 
receive and rely on a substantial amount of local government funding that 
enables them to function. Funding comes from city council appropriations, as 
well as from various local government officials through member-items.69 The 
Shomrim receive more money than other community patrol organizations and 
are “without peer when it comes to securing public money for their 
operation.”70 Government funding facilitates the purchase of sophisticated 
equipment, including state-of-the-art, police-style mobile command center 
 
the Shomrim working, literally, hand-in-hand with the NYPD to control the crowds at a young boy, Leiby 
Kletzky’s, funeral).  
 63 Matthews, supra note 9. 
 64 See SHAER, supra note 6, at 165; see also Jacob Sugarman, Watchmen, TABLET MAG. (May 26, 2011, 
7:00 AM), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/68298/watchmen (noting the Shomrim’s 
“biennial training regimen” with the NYPD). 
 65 See Sean Gardiner & Alison Fox, Civilian Patrol Was Family’s First Call, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2011, 
at A15. 
 66 See SHAER, supra note 6, at 165. 
 67 Id. Shaer asserted the group (Shmira) received this space to “keep a tight rein on the Shmira” and in 
retaliation against another Shomrim group that refused to cooperate with the NYPD. For further discussion of 
this as well as the rivalry and split between two Shomrim groups in Crown Heights, see id.  
 68 Id. at 73.  
 69 Pinto, supra note 8, at 13. Member-items, “portion[s] of state funding allocated by the [New York] 
Senate and Assembly,” must be “used for a public purpose.” Resources: Member Items, N.Y. OPEN GOV’T, 
http://www.nyopengovernment.com/NYOG/resources_member.html (last visited June 13, 2013).  
 70 Pinto, supra note 8, at 13; see also Editorial, Shomrim Shanda, N.Y. POST, Aug. 7, 2011, at 24 (noting 
that the Shomrim received $130,000 in city council member items from the 2011 budget); Matthews, supra 
note 9 (explaining that office rent and two-way radios were funded by donations, with some support from local 
elected officials, and that the Shomrim wear vests and jackets donated by the police department). Despite this 
criticism, some politicians assert that it is good sense to help equip community organizations like the 
Shomrim. See Pinto, supra note 8 (noting that Brooklyn politicians assert good sense to equip community 
organizations like the Shomrim). 
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trucks.71 The receipt of “an iniquitous amount of government funding . . . and 
preferential treatment from the fire and police departments and municipal 
services,” engender feelings of resentment among outsiders in the 
community.72 
Like any government funding, the money appropriated to the Shomrim is 
not without political motivations. Hasidic communities are well-known for 
being “the most disciplined voting bloc.”73 Because of the predictable voting 
bloc—community members vote for whomever the Rebbe proposes—Hasidic 
communities are frequently utilized by politicians, both locally and 
nationally.74 Unsurprisingly, the community wields tremendous power in New 
York politics; this is often cited as a reason police strive to keep relations with 
the Shomrim amicable.75 This political power would be troubling, especially if 
the city turns a blind eye to the Shomrim’s blatant violations. 
D. Criticisms of the Shomrim 
The Shomrim’s funding and close relationship with the state is not without 
its costs and criticisms. While police credit the Shomrim for aiding them in 
arrests, the Shomrim are also accused of discrimination against outsiders, the 
nonreporting of certain crimes, vigilantism, and a lag time in reporting 
crimes.76 The Shomrim frequently begin searches themselves, without waiting 
or calling for police aid and intervention.77 There is a “longstanding issue” 
 
 71 Pinto, supra note 8; cf. John Doyle, Van with a Plan—Orthodox Patrollers Holy Rollers in Luxeunit, 
N.Y. POST, May 25, 2009, at 17 (criticizing the $250,000 command center paid for by grants from the city). In 
March 2012, the Borough Park Shomrim received a new “state of the art” mobile command center through 
funding from the city council. The unveiling was celebrated by a wide array of government officials that 
included a U.S. Representative, the New York City comptroller, a state senator and state assemblyman, city 
council members, and NYPD inspectors. See A New State of the Art Command Center for Borough Park 
Shomrim, ASSEMBLYMAN DOV HIKIND (Mar. 26, 2012), http://dovhikind.blogspot.com/2012/03/new-state-of-
art-command-center-for.html. 
 72 Shaer, supra note 30, at 54.  
 73 Pinto, supra note 8, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74 Id.; see also SHAER, supra note 6, at 52. The “enormous power [insular group] voting blocs have in 
American politics” is well recognized, despite the famous Carolene footnote arguing for protection of such 
powerless groups. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 728 (1985).  
 75 Pinto, supra note 8, at 10 (noting the police were “careful not to antagonize the Shomrim”); see also 
Newkirk, supra note 10 (describing the disproportionate Hasidic presence on the school board and preferential 
treatment of Shomrim when they stormed the precinct).  
 76 See Kilgannon, supra note 2. 
 77 See Kilgannon, supra note 39. 
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with the Shomrim’s delay in notifying the police of suspected crime and other 
incidents.78 
Internally, the Shomrim enforce the norms of their ultrareligious sect, 
which may include covering up79 sexual abuse and child molestation.80 The 
police are so closely tied to the Shomrim that police will often call them when 
the police receive reports of sexual abuse.81 This frequently results in the 
Shomrim dissuading individuals from pressing charges,82 perpetuating the 
cycle of abuse. 
Vigilantism is a persistent problem with the Shomrim, and it usually 
manifests itself through racially discriminatory actions.83 The Shomrim are 
repeatedly charged with targeting minorities, beating up black men and 
children,84 and racial profiling.85 Minorities venturing into the Hasidic 
communities frequently are stopped and questioned on their presence in the 
area.86 Black residents who were stopped stated the Shomrim “are always 
trying to make you fe[e]l unwanted” and watched.87 One author stated: “Locals 
regularly reported being stopped and asked for identification; several men said 
they had been collared and shoved into the back of a squad car, for no 
discernible reason other than the fact that they were black.”88 
Community websites, videos on YouTube, and the Shomrim’s Facebook 
pages depict the Shomrim detaining and assisting in arresting suspected 
criminals, who are invariably depicted as minorities—outsiders to the Hasidic 
 
 78 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79 An issue with mesira, the Talmudic prohibition against telling on another Jew, is also implicated as a 
reason invoked by rabbis to justify not reporting abuse to secular authorities. See Pinto, supra note 8, at 10. 
 80 See id. at 14. When these crimes are reported to the Shomrim, the issues frequently are covered up and 
the cycle is perpetuated where “rabbis, youth leaders, and yeshiva teachers caught molesting children [are] 
shielded from the secular justice system.” Id. at 11; see also Berger, supra note 7. 
 81 See Pinto, supra note 8, at 12. 
 82 Id. at 14. 
 83 See Kilgannon, supra note 2 (describing 1996 case where members were arrested after accusations of 
beating up a black man); Matthews, supra note 9 (noting criticisms of the Shomrim as “being vigilantes who 
target blacks”); Newkirk, supra note 10 (noting that a Hispanic leader described the Shomrim as “‘vigilantes 
who have terrorized our community’”).  
 84 See Matthews, supra note 9. 
 85 See Heller, supra note 40. 
 86 See, e.g., Dan Morrison, Heights of Anger, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 11, 1996, at A05 (noting that law 
enforcement sources stated the Shomrim stop blacks and question why they are there).  
 87 See Kocieniewski, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88 See SHAER, supra note 6, at 52.  
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community.89 A promotional video demonstrates the Shomrim’s pointedly 
discriminatory pursuits.90 For example, the Shomrim video depicts the 
Shomrim in pursuit of a purse thief (a black man) and calling the police only 
after the man is caught and surrounded.91 
Minority groups claim the Shomrim receive preferential treatment from the 
NYPD and the city. Alleged preferential treatment of the Hasidic community 
in housing, parking tickets, and arrests in the past have resulted in 
investigation.92 For example, Hispanics claimed that the NYPD displayed 
favoritism by only arresting one Hasidic man after over three hundred Hasidim 
stormed a police precinct to protest a Hasidic man being charged with sexual 
abuse.93 
E. The Legal Issues Presented by the Shomrim 
The Shomrim should be held accountable for their discriminatory and 
wrongful actions, especially when they commit such actions under the auspices 
of the police and are supported almost entirely through government funding. 
However, the current recourse is insufficient to effectively control the 
Shomrim’s wrongful actions. One problem lies in the fact that the insularity of 
the community may prevent reports of wrongdoing from the inside.94 Outside 
of their community, criminal law is a possibility. Although a limited number of 
cases have been filed, criminal law is significantly underused. This may also 
be due to the Shomrim’s authoritative appearance in their community and to 
outsiders, as well as their pervasive ties with the police, who may be inclined 
to let charges slide.95 Tort liability is an additional route; however, the 
 
 89 See, e.g., Shomrim –  שומרים, One Arrested for Robbery & Bomb Scare by Boro Park Shomrim (BSSP), 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.196550410388271.45111.162855353757777&type=1 
(last visited June 18, 2013); Shomrim – שומרים, Robbery at Gunpoint, and Attempted Carjacking 5/3/11, 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.196547460388566.45109.162855353757777&type=1 
(last visited June 18, 2013). 
 90 See Pinto, supra note 8, at 12 (describing a video released by the Shomrim). To view the video, see 
Brooklyn South Safety Patrol, YOUTUBE (July 19, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-
s4RoaAt1g&feature=player_embedded. 
 91 Later in the video, Shomrim members heroically scale a balcony to catch a Hispanic man breaking into 
an apartment after a scared Hasidic child calls the Shomrim, rather than 911. See Pinto, supra note 8, at 12. 
 92 Newkirk, supra note 10.  
 93 Id. Forty-six officers were injured. Id. 
 94 This is also an issue stemming from the Jewish law of merisah, which prevents Jews from reporting 
other Jews. See Pinto, supra note 8, at 10. 
 95 Cf. Pinto, supra note 8 (discussing the political power held by the Hasidic populations because of the 
uniform way they vote). 
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potential plaintiffs are typically limited to disadvantaged groups that may not 
have access or interest in the legal system. 
The political power wielded by the Shomrim further insulates the Shomrim 
from liability. Local government officials, along with the NYPD, repeatedly 
express their gratitude for and utilize the Shomrim as a supplemental police 
force in their busy state. As a result, a perverse incentive exists for the 
government to privatize the Shomrim, thus allowing the Shomrim (as private 
actors not held to the Constitution) to do what the government could not 
constitutionally do otherwise.96 The Shomrim are accused of behavior that 
would be unquestionably unconstitutional if engaged in by public police 
officers. Thus, without appropriate recourse from politics, tort law, or criminal 
law, the Shomrim continue with their wrongful acts unfettered and funded by 
the government. 
The following two Parts of this Comment consider the actions of the 
Shomrim from a constitutional standpoint, examining the Shomrim under the 
Establishment Clause and the state action doctrine. There are difficulties 
inherent in these areas of law—both state action and Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence are complex, value laden, fact intensive, and lacking specific 
guidelines from the Supreme Court. However, considering the publicly funded 
discrimination committed by the Shomrim, an attempt at such an analysis is 
imperative. This analysis also highlights some of the implications resulting 
from the privatization of inherently religious organizations. 
II. THE SHOMRIM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: CAREFULLY TOEING 
THE LINE OF RELIGIOUS ENTANGLEMENT 
Given the inherently religious nature of the Shomrim, an observer might 
naturally think that government involvement with the Shomrim results in an 
Establishment Clause problem. This Part explores a potential Establishment 
Clause claim and finds the Shomrim may present an Establishment Clause 
problem. 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion.”97 At its core, the Establishment 
 
 96 Cf. Metzger, supra note 22 (describing the perverse reasons why private actors seek to perform 
traditional government functions). 
 97 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause was incorporated and applied to the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
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Clause is meant to prevent a “fusion of governmental and religious 
functions.”98 Unfortunately, the convoluted Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence renders it difficult to precisely draw the line of where 
government establishes religion. Strict interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause would deem the provision of “even the most essential public services”99 
to religious organizations a violation of the Establishment Clause.100 Like other 
religious organizations, it is clear that the Shomrim are not required to be 
completely isolated from government or society.101 Problems arise, for 
example, when religious leaders make government decisions or when religious 
matters receive invasive review and supervision by public officials.102 
The state then must act neutrally with religious organizations, allowing a 
certain degree of accommodation.103 However, within this proscribed 
neutrality the state must take care not to accommodate direct support to a 
religious organization too much, where the “breach of neutrality . . . today a 
trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent.”104 Although the 
Establishment Clause typically forbids “sponsorship, financial support, and 
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,”105 the issue is “one 
of degree.”106 In analyzing the aid provided, determination of an Establishment 
Clause violation hinges to a large extent on the degree of the independent 
secular function.107 Most challenging, and most likely to present an 
Establishment Clause violation, are institutions that are pervasively religious 
without a clearly independent secular function.108 These institutions are 
problematic because they require many safeguards in order to both keep 
religion separate and prevent excessive entanglement.109 For instance, aid to 
 
 98 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).  
 99 Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 975 (1980) (including public services such as fire, police, and 
transportation). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (explaining that the Establishment Clause does not 
create a complete wall between church and state). 
 102 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 11.  
 103 See generally id. at 336–51.  
 104 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).  
 105 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 106 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled by Mitchell 
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 107 6 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND 
PROCEDURE § 21.4(c)(v) (4th ed. 2008). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id.  
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certain social service providers (e.g., religious hospitals) is frequently deemed 
to have an independent, secular function of providing medical care.110 
This Part analyzes the Shomrim in the context of the Establishment 
Clause.111 First, using the nondelegation framework articulated in Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den,112 it is clear that the Shomrim are not delegated government 
authority in violation of the Establishment Clause. Second, consideration of the 
Shomrim using the test provided in Lemon v. Kurtzman113 aids in discovering 
the nature of the Shomrim. Application of the Lemon test, or any 
Establishment Clause test, is novel in this circumstance. 
While it is possible the Shomrim violate the Establishment Clause, given 
the most recent direction of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence114 ultimately it may be unlikely a court would find the 
government truly “establishes” religion through the Shomrim. Regardless, 
analysis of the Shomrim under the Establishment Clause provides insight into 
the constitutional problems posed by the privatization of government power in 
inherently religious organizations.115 
A. Delegation and the Village of Kiryas Joel 
Government power that is delegated to religious institutions may violate 
the Establishment Clause and is particularly suspect in the context of insular 
communities, “an electorate defined by common religious belief and 
practice.”116 In Larkin,117 a Massachusetts law allowed churches to block the 
issuance of liquor licenses to establishments within 500 feet of the church.118 
 
 110 See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899). See generally 6 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra 
note 107, § 21.4(c)(v). 
 111 While standing is another hurdle that must be overcome in bringing an Establishment Clause claim, for 
the purposes of this Comment standing is not substantively considered. The Court has tightened standing 
requirements in recent years, but standing would likely not be an issue here. See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. 
NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 170–73 (3d ed. 2011).  
 112 459 U.S. 116 (1982).  
 113 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 114 See generally Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 583 (2011) (noting that given recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, courts are unlikely to find an 
impermissible establishment of religion).  
 115 See infra Part IV.  
 116 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 710 (1994).  
 117 While the Supreme Court analyzed Larkin as “entanglement” under the three-pronged Lemon test, 
delegation was used independently in Kiryas Joel, without mention of Lemon, and is significant enough to be 
considered on its own.  
 118 459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982).  
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The Supreme Court held the delegation of veto power over liquor licenses 
vested “discretionary governmental powers in religious bodies.”119 Such power 
“enmeshes” churches with the exercise of government power without any 
standards or guarantees that the power will be exercised in a religiously neutral 
way.120 
While the Shomrim do not receive a specific delegation of government 
power, some facts suggest they receive a de facto delegation of government 
police power.121 The Shomrim may be “enmeshed” with the government by 
exercising police power. The Shomrim receive a license that is neutrally 
applied to all security, watch, and patrol groups to simply patrol their areas.122 
This is permissible, and had the delegation in Larkin been a generic power 
granted to all churches, it likely would not have violated the Establishment 
Clause.123 The problem with the Shomrim may stem from their “fusion” of 
“united civic and religious authority.”124 The answer turns on whether the 
Shomrim receive this power because of their religion. The Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. 
Grumet provides some guidance. 
In Kiryas Joel, the Supreme Court applied the impermissible delegation 
framework from Larkin and held the drawing of school districting lines around 
an insular Hasidic community unconstitutional. Of particular concern to the 
Court was a lack of neutrality on behalf of the legislature.125 The Hasidic 
community used its power as a voting bloc to obtain public special education 
services for its children in the segregated atmosphere preferred by its 
tradition.126 Delegation was not facially suspect and was not made in terms of 
the Hasidic religion, but rather as the village of Kiryas Joel.127 However, the 
Kiryas Joel district was created around and for the Hasidic group, and thus 
delegated power to “a group defined by its character as a religious 
 
 119 Id. at 123.  
 120 Id. at 125–26.  
 121 See supra Part I. 
 122 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 170.1 (2013). 
 123 See Alexander Volokh, The Constitutional Possibilities of Prison Vouchers, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 983, 
1018 (2011).  
 124 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696–97 (1994) (plurality 
opinion).  
 125 Id. at 702 (majority opinion).  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 699 (plurality opinion). 
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community.”128 The problem lay in the “identification . . . of the group to 
exercise civil authority in terms not expressly religious.”129 Ultimately, a 
plurality of the Court found the legislature delegated power purposefully on the 
basis of religion, rather than incidental to their religious identities.130 
Like the school board in Kiryas Joel, the Shomrim are part of a “united 
civic and religious authority”131 where their public lives are inseparable from 
their religion. Yet it is not clear that a religious purpose is the motivation 
behind the power given to the Shomrim, or that they are truly delegated any 
power. The police may simply view them as extra hands to perform their 
police work. Ultimately, Kiryas Joel highlights an important facet of the 
Shomrim—their status as members of a cohesive sect that excludes outsiders. 
Religious groups that are able to employ government power on their behalf, to 
the exclusion of others, should be viewed as suspect.132 However, a stronger 
argument lies in the Shomrim as recipients of government aid. Special 
privileges should not be afforded to small communities of particular 
religions.133 
B. The Lemon Test 
Government aid provided to the Shomrim may violate the Establishment 
Clause because the aid could have a primary effect of advancing religion. This 
section assesses this claim with the factors articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman134 
and modified in Agostini v. Felton.135 The test inquires as to (1) “whether the 
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion”; and 
 
 128 Id. at 696. This created, illegally, “a space in which they can hide from the general American 
constitutional framework and thereby protect their beliefs, practices, families, and children.” Shauna Van 
Praagh, Changing the Lens: Locating Religious Communities Within U.S. and Canadian Families and 
Constitutions, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 125, 132 (1998).  
 129 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699 (plurality opinion).  
 130 Id. at 699–701. In reaching this conclusion, the plurality looked beyond the text of the statute, finding 
that legislative history explained the true creation of the school district. Id.  
 131 Id. at 697.  
 132 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 234.  
 133 Id. at 235; see also id. at 234 (noting “it is highly doubtful whether members of a religion should be 
able to use government to promote their religion by excluding outsiders, if they have no plan for a close 
integrated social life, only a wish not to live near nonadherents”).  
 134 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The original, three-pronged Lemon test provided: “First, the statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Id. 
at 612–13 (citation omitted). 
 135 521 U.S. 203 (1997). In Agostini, the Court enveloped the third prong, entanglement, under the second 
prong “as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.” Id. at 233.  
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(2) “whether the aid has the ‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.”136 
Lemon is regarded as a guideline rather than a precise limit.137 Overall, the 
government must not appear to promote non-neutrality among religions. Of 
course, government neutrality in this case—equal funding, perhaps, to all 
religions—would cure the endorsement problems noted above. 
1. Secular Purpose 
The first prong of Lemon, a secular legislative purpose, is typically easy to 
pass. All that is required for the first prong is a substantial secular purpose, 
which may be in addition to a religious purpose.138 However, it is possible for 
the government to have a “secret” or “sham” purpose beyond the stated 
purpose.139 A primary secular purpose of funding the Shomrim may be 
improving crime control. Although there is possibly also a religious purpose—
promoting and insulating the Hasidic sects—this does not detract from the 
Shomrim’s significant secular purpose.140 
It is possible for the Shomrim to have a secular purpose but still fail the 
other prong of the Lemon test when the aid has the primary effect of advancing 
religion. Failing any one of the prongs renders government action 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.141 The rest of this section 
turns to the second prong, considered the “most significant part of the entire 
test . . . . [where] [m]ost important cases [have been] resolved.”142 
2. Primary Effect 
The second prong is most problematic because aid to the Shomrim may 
have the principal or primary effect of advancing the Hasidic religion. In 
 
 136 Id. at 222–23.  
 137 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 160 (“Lemon’s day as a complete test has already passed; but 
that does not mean its various elements are irrelevant.” (footnote omitted)). Although approaches to 
Establishment Clause litigation may vary, the Lemon test is used here because “cases decided under Lemon are 
treated as authoritative,” and other approaches “are best understood either as versions of or alternatives to 
Lemon as a whole, or to its various components.” Id. at 161.  
 138 Id. at 161. 
 139 See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860–61, 864 (2005). A “secret” motive may 
be so secret that an objective observer does not see its impermissible purpose. In such a case, this does not 
cause the law to fail the purpose prong. Additionally, for “secret” motives, the Court in McCreary County 
advocated a “wait and see” approach as to whether the action actually did advance religion. Id. at 863.  
 140 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 175 (noting that “improper effects may also flow from 
acceptable purposes”). 
 141 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1202 (3d ed. 2006).  
 142 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 174. 
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Agostini, the Court provided three primary criteria to evaluate whether 
government aid or action has the effect of advancing religion: (1) government 
indoctrination or endorsement;143 (2) recipients of aid defined by reference to 
religion; and (3) creation of an excessive entanglement.144 
An impermissible advancement of religion may occur when a state directly 
funds a religious program, or where there is a close identification between the 
state and the religious denomination.145 Courts look to whether the government 
action can be seen as suggesting a symbolic endorsement, sending the message 
that the government endorses or evinces a particular preference for a religion 
or practice.146 
The Shomrim highlight the problem of government endorsement of a 
particular group. If the Shomrim racially and even religiously discriminate, the 
government should not be seen as endorsing such a practice by funding and 
working with the religious group. Here again the focus must be on whether the 
government itself is seen as advancing religion through its activities and 
influence.147 In Parents’ Ass’n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, female Hasidic students 
were taught Yiddish in public school classrooms only they could use.148 The 
Second Circuit found the government’s support could be deemed symbolic 
endorsement of the Hasidic sect’s “inherently divisive” separatism.149 In 
Bollenbach v. Board of Education of Monroe–Woodbury Central School 
District, another case involving the same Hasidic group in Kiryas Joel, the 
school district promoted male bus drivers with lesser seniority over a group of 
female bus drivers in order to accommodate the separatist tenets of the Hasidic 
sect.150 The court held the accommodation demonstrated symbolic 
endorsement of the discriminatory practice, which had the primary effect of 
advancing religion.151 
Direct aid received by the Shomrim may pose Establishment Clause 
problems because the aid gives the appearance of government endorsement. 
 
 143 Because Agostini focused on school funding, where indoctrination is more relevant, the proceeding 
analysis will focus on endorsement.  
 144 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997). 
 145 Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. 203.  
 146 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141, at 1204.  
 147 See id. at 1205.  
 148 803 F.2d 1235 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 149 Id. at 1241.  
 150 Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ. of Monroe–Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 659 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
 151 Id. at 1475. 
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Endorsement turns on whether funding results from the private individual’s 
decision making, or through state decision making.152 A direct subsidy or 
“unrestricted cash payments”153 to organizations or persons who inculcate 
religious beliefs may be seen as government indoctrination, thus advancing 
religion.154 In contrast, indirect aid does not pose the same problems because 
government funds flow to the sectarian organizations through the private 
choice of individuals.155 For example, many school vouchers are held as 
permissible because the government money reaches the schools “only as a 
result of the genuinely independent and private choices” of the parents.156 
The Shomrim’s receipt of direct subsidies presents a strong argument for 
endorsement, and thus an impermissible advancement of religion. The 
Shomrim’s existence and practice is founded on their intent to live an insular 
life. The government aid, without which the Shomrim would not be able to 
function, has the primary effect of endorsing and advancing this purpose 
premised on exclusion. As discussed earlier, aid to the Shomrim may be seen 
as advancing the Hasidic religion because of the “united civic and religious 
authority” represented in the insular Hasidic sects.157 
Because the Shomrim do not receive their money through criteria that 
identify beneficiaries according to religion, the second “primary effect” 
consideration is not at issue. Aid that is allocated on a neutral basis, rather than 
by definition of a particular religion, does not favor religion.158 When aid is not 
based on neutral criteria, there may be financial incentive to indoctrinate.159 
While there is not a great deal of information regarding the availability of the 
aid received by the Shomrim to other religions, it does not appear that the 
Shomrim receive money on the basis of religion. Of course, like the town in 
Kiryas Joel, there is an argument that the Shomrim are part and parcel of the 
Hasidic religion. However, lacking evidence to the contrary a court would 
 
 152 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).  
 153 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2001).  
 154 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).  
 155 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997). However, indirect aid still presents the problem of 
fungibility—the idea that government aid to one part is support to the whole—because it frees up other money 
to be spent on religious activities. See Saperstein, supra note 15, at 1384.  
 156 Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986).  
 157 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 697 (1994) (plurality 
opinion); see also supra Part II.A.  
 158 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231–32.  
 159 Id. at 231. 
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likely presume the aid received by the Shomrim would be available to all 
religions. 
It is possible that aid to the Shomrim violates the Establishment Clause 
because it fosters an excessive entanglement. In Agostini, the Supreme Court 
identified a few factors indicative of an excessive entanglement, including 
continued monitoring, administrative entanglement, and the danger of 
increased “political divisiveness.”160 Administrative entanglement may result 
from the extra safeguards, such as monitoring, that are required to keep 
religion separate.161 Political divisiveness is concerned with the possibility of 
“‘continuing political strife’”—the “serious potential for divisive conflict over 
the issue of aid to religion.”162 
It should be noted that the entanglement must truly be excessive, as 
entanglement can usually be overcome by less than pervasive monitoring.163 
For example, impermissible entanglement results when the government pays 
parochial teacher salaries.164 Such aid would require excessive, continuing 
government entanglement with religion in order to monitor and ensure teachers 
were not impermissibly indoctrinating or endorsing religion.165 In Bollenbach, 
providing male bus drivers to accommodate the Hasidic community would 
have resulted in excessive entanglement.166 Administrative entanglement 
would have resulted from the “substantial increase in the number of 
administrative contacts” and continuing consultations on implementation 
problems.167 Further, political division had already ensued in Bollenbach, 
illustrated by the national attention the bus controversy attained.168 Conversely, 
 
 160 See id. at 233–34 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 6 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 107, 
at 113. 
 161 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (warning that “a comprehensive, discriminating, 
and continuing state surveillance” might be necessary to ensure the First Amendment is respected).  
 162 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).  
 163 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 861–62 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “pervasive 
monitoring” is not necessary for “constitutionally sufficient” safeguards); see also Volokh, supra note 123, at 
993 n.59 (noting self-auditing and occasional monitoring visits would be sufficient monitoring, but would not 
create excessive entanglement). Additionally, Volokh asserted “the Establishment Clause concern isn’t 
pervasive monitoring as such, but pervasive monitoring that leads to entanglement with religion.” Id. at 994 
n.59. 
 164 See Agostini, 521 U.S. 203. 
 165 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141, at 1206. 
 166 Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ. of Monroe–Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1465–66 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 1466.  
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excessive entanglement was not found in the sale of public land to a Hasidic 
sect in Southside Fair Housing Committee v. City of New York.169 While the 
plaintiffs represented an exclusionary community, the completed sale 
foreclosed the potential for continuing government interaction and 
entanglement.170 
With the Shomrim, a court might be able to find that the administrative 
safeguards and diversions are necessary, as well as that any resulting political 
division reaches a constitutionally impermissible level. Like the school district 
in Bollenbach, the Shomrim would require ongoing monitoring to ensure funds 
are diverted to nonreligious uses; therefore pervasive monitoring would be 
required.171 Criticism of the Shomrim’s actions and their unparalleled level of 
government funding already exists, and lately such criticism has received more 
attention.172 The strongest argument lies in the speculation that the Shomrim 
receive the amount of funding they do because of their existence as a voting 
bloc.173 However, the Supreme Court’s recent Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence complicates the result. Because the Supreme Court has 
increasingly approved of more forms of aid174 and retreated from strict rules 
governing aid, an Establishment Clause argument, while possible, may not be 
the strongest argument. 
Although the Establishment Clause argument would bar the excessive 
funding of the Shomrim, ultimately it would not regulate their discriminatory 
actions. In the case of the Shomrim, this issue is best explored in the next Part 
discussing state action. State action provides a stronger argument and a better 
recourse to solve the aforementioned problem of bias crimes and 
discriminatory policing. The following Part argues the Shomrim are state 
actors. 
 
 169 750 F. Supp. 575, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 928 F.2d 1336 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 170 Id. 
 171 Note that this ongoing monitoring is different from the case in another Hasidic neighborhood, where 
ongoing monitoring was not necessary because it was a closed sale. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
 172 See supra Part I.  
 173 However, some political division exists within the Hasidic sects—one rival Shomrim group has gone 
so far as to sue the City of New York for its relationship with another Shomrim group. See Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Crown Heights Shomrim Volunteer Safety Patrol, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 
No. 11 CV 0329 (KAM)(JMA) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2011). Although the case alleges the City of New York’s 
work with the Shmira transforms the Shmira into state actors, the argument is applicable here as clear political 
strife results from perceived unequal/non-neutral government funding. See also SHAER, supra note 6, at 65–66. 
 174 See WITTE, supra note 111, at 186 (“The emerging trend . . . is that the establishment clause . . . is 
becoming weaker and therefore less attractive to religious liberty litigants.”).  
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III.  THE SHOMRIM QUALIFY AS STATE ACTORS: WHEN THE “EYES AND EARS” 
BECOME THE STATE 
Because the Shomrim have close ties to the state and perform a policing 
function, they should be considered state actors. While the Constitution and its 
amendments protect certain individual rights and liberties, most provisions 
apply only to actions fairly considered to be those of the government.175 In the 
case of the Shomrim, whether constitutional limitations apply depends on 
whether there are sufficient contacts with and embodiments of the government 
to transform otherwise private actors into “state actors.”176 If the Shomrim are 
private actors and there is no state action, the Shomrim’s exclusion of others 
on the basis of their race or religion does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177 
When otherwise private conduct takes on a public character and has 
interrelated, sufficient contacts with the government, the action and its 
subsequent liability may be reached through the state action doctrine. The 
Shomrim go beyond merely acting as “eyes and ears” of the NYPD, working 
closely with the government in aid of a public function.178 This transforms 
private conduct into state action. The discriminatory nature of the Shomrim’s 
conduct further strengthens the likelihood that a court would find state action. 
Consideration as state actors would implicate both constitutional liability and 
government liability for the Shomrim. 
First, this Part analyzes the Shomrim under two tests for state action, as 
performing a public function, and having a close nexus with the government. 
Then, this Part incorporates the theory of substantive legal claims as a decisive 
factor in finding state action, and it finds that the discriminatory nature of the 
Shomrim render them more likely to be considered state actors. Finally, this 
Part places the Shomrim in the context of privatization and considers the 
perverse incentives of state action. 
 
 175 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & 
PROCEDURE 1053 (5th ed. 2012). 
 176 See id. at 1056–58. 
 177 See id. at 1058. 
 178 See Kilgannon, supra note 2 (noting that a police spokesman has called the Shomrim the “‘eyes and 
ears’” for the police); News Release, N.Y. State Senator Eric Adams, NYS Senator Eric Adams Joins Other 
Elected Officials and Community Leaders to Present Citations of Merit for Hatzolah and Shomrim (Jan. 24, 
2008), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/news/nys-senator-eric-adams-joins-other-elected-officials-and-
community-leaders-present-citations-me (noting that the Shomrim “serv[e] as vigilant eyes and ears”).  
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A. The State Action Doctrine 
Proving the Shomrim are state actors would provide a vehicle for 
constitutional liability.179 However, establishing that a private actor is a state 
actor is rarely easy. Academics, attorneys, and even Supreme Court Justices 
acknowledge that state action is a “conceptual disaster area,”180 where the 
caselaw distinguishing public and private spheres “[has] not been a model of 
consistency.”181 
When private actors wield government power, private actions fairly 
attributable to the government are treated as state action and are therefore 
subject to constitutional constraints.182 State action works both to provide 
constitutional restraint on those acting as the government, as well as to detach 
liability for actions that are purely private and individual.183 Government 
accountability, along with an individual’s rights, is of primary concern when a 
private actor is exercising government power.184 
Analysis of state action185 begins with the general premise that “the 
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly 
attributable to the State.”186 In this case, the question is whether the Shomrim’s 
actions are fairly attributable to the state. If they are, then their conduct would 
be deemed to cause a deprivation under both the Equal Protection Clause and 
the substantive due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.187 To 
 
 179 The Fourteenth Amendment made the Constitution applicable to state and municipal actors. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State” (emphasis added)). Early on, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 11 (1883), the Supreme Court clarified that the Constitution’s protections were not intended to apply to 
private actors, and the Supreme Court more recently affirmed that Congress cannot regulate private conduct 
using Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).  
 180 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, 
and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).  
 181 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 182 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141, at 507–39.  
 183 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).  
 184 See Metzger, supra note 22, at 1370–73. 
 185 This is the same test for “color of law” under § 1983. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 n.2 (2001) (“If a defendant’s conduct satisfies the state-action requirement 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct also constitutes action ‘under color of state law’ for § 1983 
purposes.” (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935)).  
 186 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
 187 The Shomrim violate the Equal Protection Clause because their discriminatory treatment of outsiders 
violates an individual’s right to equal treatment by the state. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, a court would consider whether the action was done through a classification, and whether the action 
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resolve the question of whether a party is a state actor, courts apply this general 
principle along with various tests encompassing factors articulated by the 
Supreme Court.188 In the following sections, this Comment addresses state 
action by applying the two main tests used—public function and close 
nexus.189 These tests demonstrate the Shomrim are state actors who inflict 
injuries that are “aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental 
authority.”190 
Thus, the Shomrim provide a novel and important application of the state 
action doctrine in the realm of privatization.191 Although scholars have 
confronted the question of whether private police should be considered state 
actors,192 few have confronted whether community-watch groups may be state 
actors,193 and most assume they are simply private actors.194 Even if the 
Shomrim are deemed state actors, other similarly licensed community-watch 
organizations are not necessarily rendered state actors. 
 
met the appropriate level of scrutiny (in this case, likely strict scrutiny because of race). There is a violation of 
substantive due process because the Shomrim’s actions infringe on an individual’s fundamental right to be free 
from discrimination. See id. (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law”).  
 188 Cases often involve discussions of and fall under multiple different tests or standards. CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 141, at 518. Chemerinsky also noted the Court is not always clear on which test it is using and 
discussing. Id.; see also Metzger, supra note 22, at 1412–13 (describing the factors considered and asserting 
the Court sometimes adopts formalistic and distinct “tests”).  
 189 For the purposes of this analysis, ensconced under close nexus includes what some courts and scholars 
may otherwise call the “joint action” and “symbiotic relationship” tests.  
 190 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 615 (1991).  
 191 A case is currently pending in the Eastern District of New York against the City of New York and one 
of the Shomrim groups under a state action theory. See Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
Crown Heights Shomrim Volunteer Safety Patrol, Inc. v. City of N.Y., No. 11 CV 0329 (KAM)(JMA) 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2011). The case was filed by a rival Shomrim group. For an interesting history of the 
Shomrim–Shmira rivalry in Crown Heights, see SHAER, supra note 6, at 101–11, 116–17.  
 192 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573.  
 193 Jack Wenik brought up the question of auxiliary police and block-watcher liability in a footnote. See 
Jack Wenik, Note, Forcing the Bystander to Get Involved: A Case for a Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report 
Crime, 94 YALE L.J. 1787, 1797 n.77 (1985). However, with the highly publicized murder and trial for the 
killing of Trayvon Martin, an African-American teenager by a neighborhood-watch member on patrol, 
questioning the liability of neighborhood-watch-style policing may be on the rise. See Sharon Finegan, 
Watching the Watchers: The Growing Privatization of Criminal Law Enforcement and the Need for Limits on 
Neighborhood Watch Associations, 8 U. MASS. L. REV. 88 (2013).   
 194 But see M. Rhead Enion, Note, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State’s Allocation of 
Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 553 (2009). Enion argued certain “private police” forces, including residential 
security guards, should be considered state actors because they act as “arms of the state,” responding to a 
“public demand for order and security” by supplying force. Id.  
STERNLIEB GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013  11:49 AM 
1438 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1411 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that “to fashion and 
apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal 
Protection Clause is an ‘impossible task’ which ‘[t]his Court has never 
attempted.’”195 As each situation and application is unique, “[o]nly by sifting 
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State 
in private conduct be attributed its true significance.”196 While the lack of clear 
principles and bright-line tests renders an analysis of state action complicated, 
it is not an insurmountable task. This section considers the cases where the 
courts have found state action to explain why the Shomrim are state actors. 
1. The Shomrim Perform a Public Function 
Because the Shomrim perform police services, one might think the 
Shomrim perform a public function. For state action under the public function 
test, the private entity must exercise “powers traditionally exclusively reserved 
to the State.”197 The Supreme Court has found state action with a company-
owned town,198 a public park,199 and private parties carrying out primary 
elections.200 
State action exists where an entity performing a public function works for 
the purpose of “maintaining order and controlling crime . . . paradigmatic 
governmental functions.”201 For example, in Evans v. Newton, the Supreme 
Court held that the transfer of a park from the public to private sector did not 
dissolve its “tradition of municipal control” and “public character.”202 A basic 
government function is protecting the security of the individual and 
property,203 something the Shomrim work fervently to protect. Although 
policing in general has never been entirely public,204 today many see the 
maintenance of order and crime control as “inherently public functions,” 
 
 195 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port 
Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).  
 198 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 199 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
 200 See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). See generally 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS & DEFENSES § 5.14(A) (4th ed. Supp. 2011). 
 201 David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1999).  
 202 Evans, 382 U.S. at 301, 302.  
 203 Sklansky, supra note 201, at 1188.  
 204 Id. at 1225. If taken to its logical extreme, even the public police would not be considered government 
actors because the police were originally private. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 200, § 5.14(A).  
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rightly assumed by the government or its actors.205 While Justice Rehnquist 
suggested in National League of Cities v. Usery that police protection is a 
“traditional government function[],”206 it is unclear and unlikely that police 
power is “traditionally reserved” exclusively to the state.207 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status of the private police 
just once, in 1964. In Griffin v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held a specially 
deputized, private security guard was a state actor when he “purported to 
exercise the authority of a deputy sheriff” and publicly enforced the park’s 
private racial segregation policy.208 Typically, the lower federal courts have 
largely considered private police to be state actors only when they are 
officially deputized.209 
Private police are more likely to be deemed state actors when they look and 
function like the police.210 For instance, the auxiliary police are generally 
considered state actors, particularly because of their appearance of authority 
similar to the regular police.211 The auxiliary police function as unarmed, 
uniformed patrols that assist the police and operate police-style vehicles.212 
Uniforms and similar patrol cars provide auxiliary police with “the symbolic 
authority of the public police.”213 Auxiliary police volunteers are trained by the 
police to provide additional “eyes and ears” to the police, assisting with patrol 
 
 205 Sklansky, supra note 201, at 1194. Sklansky asserted “if policing is not a public function, it is hard to 
imagine that much else is,” and asserted policing as a good test case for the vitality of the public function 
doctrine. Id. at 1259. He also argued the state action doctrine proves unable to distinguish private police from 
either public law enforcement or private citizenry. Id. at 1229.  
 206 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985).  
 207 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 175, § 16.2. But see Evans, 382 U.S. at 302 (comparing a park that 
had been transferred from public to private control, to a “police department that traditionally serves the 
community”).  
 208 378 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1964). It is not entirely clear how much weight this case still holds. The Court 
later “express[ed] no view” on whether a state could delegate police functions to private parties, thus 
“avoid[ing] the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1978). 
But see id. at 172 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is clear that the maintenance of a police force is a unique 
sovereign function, and the delegation of police power to a private party will entail state action.”).  
 209 Sklansky, supra note 201, at 1229–30.  
 210 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 302 (looking at the character and purpose of a park as municipal, despite its 
private ownership); cf. Griffin, 378 U.S. at 135 (noting the guard was a state actor because he “purported to 
exercise . . . authority” when he arrested and instituted prosecutions against trespassers).  
 211 See, e.g., People v. Luciani, 466 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sup. Ct. 1983); Peter J. Gardner, Comment, Arrest and 
Search Powers of Special Police in Pennsylvania: Do Your Constitutional Rights Change Depending on the 
Officer’s Uniform?, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 497 (1986). 
 212 N.Y. AUXILIARY POLICE DEP’T, AUXILIARY POLICE PROGRAM OVERVIEW 10 (2008).  
 213 Sklanksy, supra note 201, at 1228.  
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of residential and commercial areas, at community events, traffic control, and 
crime prevention.214 
Like the auxiliary police, the Shomrim are also unarmed, uniformed, and 
function in a similar fashion. Some Shomrim members are even members of 
the NYPD auxiliary force.215 The Shomrim emit an appearance of authority, 
similar to the auxiliary police, and operate police-style vehicles.216 Driving 
such analogous patrol cars likely causes others to confuse the Shomrim with 
police. 
The Shomrim look, act, and consider themselves a part of the police—and 
frequently so do the police.217 Articles are replete with examples and 
statements of the “close relationship” that exists between the NYPD and the 
Shomrim.218 The Shomrim sometimes work directly with the police219 and are 
similar to the police in their uniforms, patrol cars,220 decals, and logos.221 
Officials recognize the Shomrim for their contribution to the suppression of 
crime and increased safety,222 and the officials thank them for their work “in 
conjunction with [the] NYPD to promote a secure neighborhood 
environment.”223 One local government official promulgates the Shomrim’s 
number on a flyer of emergency numbers.224 Notably, one police lieutenant 
 
 214 Careers—Auxiliary Police, N.Y. POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/careers/ 
auxiliary_police.shtml (last visited June 18, 2013). While on duty, auxiliary police are considered city 
employees and receive workers compensation for on-duty related injuries. N.Y. AUXILIARY POLICE DEP’T, 
supra note 212, at 18; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 14–147 (2013), available at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/ 
LAWSSEAF.cgi?QUERYTYPE=LAWS+&QUERYDATA=$$ADC14-147$$@TXADC014-147+&LIST= 
LAW+&BROWSER=BROWSER+&TOKEN=53422701+&TARGET=VIEW. 
 215 SHAER, supra note 6, at 73. 
 216 See supra notes 57–58; see also N.Y. AUXILIARY POLICE DEP’T, supra note 212, at 10. 
 217 Uriel Heilman, Policing the Hassidim, JERUSALEM POST, June 5, 2003, at 8 (quoting a commander at 
the 66th precinct as saying “‘I look at the Shomrim like they’re the NYPD’”).  
 218 See, e.g., Cate Doty, New Yorkers Oppose Site of Islamic Center, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM 
(Sept. 3, 2010, 9:19 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/new-yorkers-oppose-site-of-islamic-
center-poll-finds/ (noting the longtime “close relationship” between the Shomrim and the local precinct).  
 219 See, e.g., supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.  
 220 See supra notes 57–58.  
 221 See supra notes 50–58 and accompanying text (describing and depicting the visual similarities 
between the Shomrim and the NYPD).  
 222 Pinto, supra note 8; cf. On Roshhashana, Baltimore County Police Express Gratitude, BALT. SUN, 
Sept. 10, 2010, at A4 (including the Baltimore police chief crediting Shomrim for their work and contribution 
to the decline in crime). While this report refers to the Shomrim in Baltimore, it is likely parallel in New York 
and other areas where the Shomrim patrol.  
 223 News Release, N.Y. State Senator Eric Adams, supra note 178.  
 224 See, e.g., ASSEMBLYMEMBER JIM BRENNAN’S IMPORTANT PHONE NUMBERS & WEBSITES, 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/045/20110830/index.pdf (last visited June 18, 2013). 
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stated police patrols are increased on both the weekly Sabbath and holy 
days,225 days when the Shomrim do not patrol.226 These actions suggest the 
Shomrim perform part of the police’s “public function.” 
The Shomrim work closer with the police than typical private police, and 
they have the same agenda as the police in the protection of the community. 
One argument against holding the private police as state actors distinguishes 
the private police from state police because of divergent goals.227 While the 
state may primarily be concerned with crime prevention, private policing is 
client driven and focused on specific loss prevention.228 Thus, private policing 
is not actually fulfilling the “essential” public function of the police. This 
policy rationale does not apply to the Shomrim or groups like the auxiliary 
police, who supplant the police and patrol with the analogous aim of 
preventing crime.229 
State action under the public function test is frequently found in 
conjunction with some of the other indicia of state action.230 The argument for 
the Shomrim as state actors is particularly strong when considering their public 
function as an additional factor in their close nexus to the state. Thus, the next 
section examines the Shomrim under the close nexus test. 
2. The Shomrim Have a Close Nexus with the State 
While the Shomrim are likely state actors because they perform a public 
function, an even stronger argument for finding state action lies in the 
Shomrim’s close nexus with the government. Whether a private party is a state 
actor depends on the relationship between the government and the private 
party. Although the Supreme Court has eschewed setting a bright-line test, a 
“close nexus” resulting from contacts and a close connection with the 
government may render the actions of a private party state action.231 The 
Supreme Court provided the following test for state action in Brentwood 
 
 225 Ari L. Goldman, The Talk of Williamsburg; Hasidic Enclave: A Step Back to Older Values, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 1986, at B1 (noting the NYPD increases patrols on these days because “the Hasidim are likely 
to spend most of the day in synagogues or . . . out of town”).  
 226 While the Shomrim do not patrol on the Sabbath, they do have a twenty-four-hour hotline.  
 227 See Joh, supra note 192. 
 228 Id. at 587.  
 229 Although there is a valid argument that the Shomrim are client-driven, they are not looking at loss 
prevention, but crime prevention in aid of the state. 
 230 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141. 
 231 See generally 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 175, at 1087–101. 
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Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n: “[S]tate action may be 
found if . . . there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged 
action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the 
State itself.’”232 Primarily, state action assesses whether there is government 
animus behind otherwise “private” conduct. 
In deciphering “[w]hat is fairly attributable,” the Supreme Court has 
identified a “host of facts” bearing on a “close nexus” of state action.233 
Although the “close nexus” test234 is far from black and white, certain factors 
can be ascertained from the Court’s jurisprudence.235 Each case is necessarily 
contingent on the particular facts and circumstances presented in order to give 
proper significance to the “nonobvious involvement of the State.”236 The 
Shomrim’s performance of a public function237 is one factor weighing in favor 
of state action. This section proceeds by discussing some of the other factors 
that have resulted in an attribution of state action: government entwinement 
with control or management, coercive power and significant encouragement, 
and willful participation in joint activity with the state.238 
a. Entwinement 
Private action may be fairly attributed to the state when government is 
“entwined in [its] management or control.”239 In Brentwood Academy, the 
Supreme Court held state action existed because of the “pervasive 
entwinement of public institutions and public officials” in an interscholastic 
athletic association.240 The state had oversight of the association’s rules and 
regulations, and the organization’s officials were largely public school 
officials.241 The state board acknowledged the association’s official character 
“by winks and nods.”242 The state board’s use of the program for public school 
 
 232 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).  
 233 Id. at 295–96. 
 234 Although the names for tests differ, each considers the same set of facts and circumstances in 
deciphering state action.  
 235 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295–96. 
 236 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).  
 237 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 238 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296. 
 239 Id. at 296 (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)).  
 240 Id. at 298.  
 241 Id. at 299–301.  
 242 Id. at 301.  
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education requirements, as well as the review and approval of the association’s 
rules and regulations, confirmed a close relationship.243 
Courts also look to whether the benefits obtained from the relationship with 
the state are unique and indispensable. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court 
found the relationship between the school and the state was no different from 
the relationship of “many contractors performing services for the 
government.”244 Similarly, in Gallagher v. “Neil Young Freedom Concert,” 
the Tenth Circuit held the benefits derived from a government lease to a 
university were not an “indispensable element[] in the University’s financial 
success.”245 
Like the association in Brentwood, the Shomrim’s actions are entwined 
with the state. The close relationship between the Shomrim and the NYPD is 
frequently acknowledged.246 Without this close relationship and the resulting 
mutual benefits, there would be no recognizable Shomrim.247 Acting as 
additional police, the NYPD is able to lessen its load by relying on the 
Shomrim to fill the gap and do part of the work within their neighborhoods.248 
As mentioned previously, the police rely on the Shomrim to such an extent that 
they must increase police patrols in Jewish areas on days the Shomrim do not 
patrol.249 In some cases, police may even delegate duties to the Shomrim.250 
The Shomrim and the state’s close relationship extend even further. Not 
only are some members involved with the NYPD as auxiliary police officers 
and through the COP (Civilian Observation Patrol) programs, the Shomrim 
also undergo training with the NYPD.251 The NYPD has specific community 
liaisons well versed in and understanding of the particular Hasidic culture.252 
 
 243 Id. This may be similar to what has been termed a “symbiotic relationship” in Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 175, § 16.4(b). While 
Burton is now rarely regarded as good law, it demonstrated another close relationship between the state and a 
private actor.  
 244 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982).  
 245 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).  
 246 E.g., Pinto, supra note 8, at 10. 
 247 See Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 300 (“There would be no recognizable Association, legal or tangible, 
without the public school officials . . . .”).  
 248 See supra Part I.  
 249 Goldman, supra note 225. The Shomrim do not patrol on Shabbat (Friday evenings and Saturdays) and 
other Jewish holidays. See id. 
 250 Cf. Justin George, For 30 Years, Watching Out for Northwest, BALT. SUN, Nov. 30, 2012, at A1 
(referring to the Shomrim in Baltimore).  
 251 See SHAER, supra note 6, at 165–66; see also supra text accompanying note 66. 
 252 See SHAER, supra note 6, at 32. 
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This relationship is specific to the Shomrim, as “in no other neighborhood do 
the police enjoy as positive a relationship with the people they protect.”253 The 
NYPD is “sensitive” to the needs of the Hasidic community, “continually 
looking out for the community in every respect.”254 One journalist asserted that 
the imbalance of power found in these Hasidic neighborhoods resulted from 
their “unparalleled unity and ability to deliver a bloc vote [enabling] the 
Hasidim to wield tremendous political power in the local arena and to garner a 
disproportionate percentage of local services.”255 Many sources cite the voting 
power of the Hasidic community as a reason why the police frequently turn a 
blind eye to some of the Shomrim’s transgressions.256 The benefits inured 
through the government are an indispensable part of the Shomrim’s actions. 
b. Coercion and Encouragement 
The Supreme Court provided that “a State normally can be held responsible 
for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has 
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice 
must in law be deemed to be that of the State.”257 Of course, mere funding is 
insufficient to find state action where coercion or encouragement is absent,258 
as is mere licensing.259 For example, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, the 
Supreme Court held state action did not exist where the state licensed a private 
club that exercised racially restrictive policies.260 The state’s action in Moose 
Lodge was that of a neutral licensing board, and the discriminatory conduct 
was not encouraged by the state.261 Even pervasive government regulation of a 
privately run program is not enough to turn private conduct into state action 
without government coercion or encouragement. Therefore, while the 
 
 253 Heilman, supra note 217. Additionally, the patrol members often aid the state by offering eyewitness 
or expert testimony in criminal cases, free of charge. Id. 
 254 Id.  
 255 Elizabeth Kadetsky, Turf Wars in Williamsburg: My Neighbor, My Enemy, 253 NATION 839, 840 
(1991).  
 256 Pinto, supra note 8, at 13.  
 257 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis added).  
 258 See id. (deciding that funding and state regulations did not turn nursing home decision into state 
action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (finding no state action in discharge of employee despite 
private school’s state funding). 
 259 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (finding the private club’s racial 
discrimination was not state action due to neutral licensing).  
 260 Id. at 179. 
 261 Id. at 178–79. However, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Moose Lodge focused on the fact that it could 
perceive little real harm done by the racially restrictive club. But cf. infra Part III.B.  
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Shomrim are licensed262 and regulated263 by the state, this does not by itself 
indicate state action. 
Thus, analysis hinges on the animus behind the action—was the 
government coercing the action or providing significant encouragement? If the 
answer is yes, then there is more reason to find state action because the 
government seemingly sanctioned the action. This is an important distinction, 
especially in situations regarding government funding. For instance, in 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, despite significant funding from the state, the Supreme 
Court held state action did not exist when a private school discharged an 
employee over a dispute.264 The state could not be responsible for the private 
decision because the school’s choices regarding employment practices were 
not compelled or even influenced by the state’s funding or state regulation.265 
The funding and regulation in no way changed the “relationship between the 
school and its teachers.”266 
In contrast to generalized government aid and services, the allocation of 
specialized aid or benefits has the potential to imbue the action with 
government support for discriminatory practices.267 Providing aid in a limited 
and specific fashion has the potential to be seen as the state’s choice to directly 
aid or support a particular private action.268 In Norwood v. Harrison, the 
Supreme Court found the provision of free books to students269 attending 
racially discriminatory schools could be seen as manifesting the state’s choice 
to encourage discrimination.270 “[T]angible aid” should not “facilitate, 
reinforce, [or] support private discrimination.”271 In Gilmore v. City of 
Montgomery, the Court found the city’s choice to give racially segregated 
 
 262 Kilgannon, supra note 2. 
 263 See DIV. OF LICENSING SERVS., N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE, PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS, BAIL ENFORCEMENT 
AGENTS, WATCH, GUARD OR PATROL AGENCIES AND SECURITY GUARDS LICENSING LAW (2011). 
 264 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841–43 (1982).  
 265 Id. at 841–42. But see id. at 849–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“When an entity is not only heavily 
regulated and funded by the State, but also provides a service that the State is required to provide, there is a 
very close nexus with the State. Under these circumstances, it is entirely appropriate to treat the entity as an 
arm of the State.”). 
 266 Id. at 841 (majority opinion). 
 267 See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 175, § 16.4(c). 
 268 See id. 
 269 The court called the books “tangible aid in the form of textbooks.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 
455, 464–65 (1973).  
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. at 464, 466.  
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groups exclusive use of public facilities presented a state action problem.272 In 
both Norwood and Gilmore, the Supreme Court found the choice could be 
perceived as belonging to the states. Above all, states cannot “induce, 
encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what [they are] 
constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.”273 
The government’s specific aid and encouragement transforms the 
Shomrim’s otherwise private actions into state action. The government here 
may be seen as encouraging, facilitating, and supporting discriminatory actions 
that would be constitutionally forbidden if performed by the state. Funding is 
specifically apportioned to the Shomrim and supplemented by donations or 
purchases from the state. One New York state senator appropriated funds for 
the purchase of bulletproof vests for additional safety after Shomrim members 
were shot.274 This suggested the state expected the Shomrim to be in the same 
dangerous line of duty as the regular police. This evidence should call into 
question the claim that Shomrim are considered police only for their own 
community. One would expect enforcing traditional customs—the segregation 
of women, celebrations of religious holidays, and prayer, to name a few—
would rarely necessitate protection from bullets. Considering the history of the 
Shomrim and their relationship with the NYPD,275 the police cannot deny their 
knowledge of the Shomrim’s actions. While one may argue the Shomrim act to 
further their own ends (keeping their community safe and free from outsiders 
to their religion), it is hard to argue their actions are not also in some way 
intended to help law enforcement efforts to keep the community safe. 
Unlike the aid in Rendell-Baker,276 the Shomrim’s discriminatory actions 
are influenced by the direct aid and encouragement of the NYPD. The funding 
encourages the Shomrim to go beyond their community police work and 
function more like the NYPD. The NYPD explicitly encourages the Shomrim 
to catch criminals and hold them until the NYPD gets there. If it were not for 
 
 272 417 U.S. 556 (1974).  
 273 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465 (quoting Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475–76 (M.D. 
Ala. 1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 274 News Release, N.Y. State Senator Eric Adams, NYS Senator Eric Adams Holds a Press Conference to 
Donate Bullet Proof Vests to Members of the Boro Park Safety Patrol, in Response to Shooting of Three of the 
Group’s Members (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/nys-senator-eric-adams-
holds-press-conference-donate-bullet-proof-vests-members-boro-p. 
 275 See supra Part I. 
 276 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In Rendell-Baker, the Court found there was no state action in the discharge of an 
employee, despite the private school’s state funding.  
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this encouragement, the Shomrim, who typically avoid the American legal 
system, would be unlikely to even go to the police. 
c. Willful Participant in Joint Activity 
State action may also be present where public officials and private actors 
work together to reach a common objective. In Dennis v. Sparks, the Supreme 
Court held that state action existed because the defendant was “a willful 
participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”277 Decisive acts of 
private parties carried out by a state official may be state action if “jointly 
engaged with state officials in the prohibited action.”278 For example, a private 
business may be considered a state actor when an off-duty police officer, 
working as a security guard, acts on behalf of the business and is perceived by 
the public as a police officer.279 In Wickersham v. City of Columbia, the Eighth 
Circuit found joint action between a private corporation and the police 
department converted private action into state action when the police 
department knowingly agreed to enforce rules that restricted free speech.280 
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Shomrim’s actions may be attributed to 
the state when they act jointly with the police. The Shomrim make a concerted 
effort with the police; the Shomrim catch alleged criminals, and the police are 
called to arrest them.281 This joint action may convert the Shomrim into state 
actors if there is no independent investigation of the alleged criminal.282 
 
 277 449 U.S. 24, 27−28 (1980).  
 278 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 
794 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 279 Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964). Courts have also been more willing to find state action 
in private police who are deputized or made “special police” and given greater powers of arrest than an 
ordinary citizen. See, e.g., Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding no state action when a 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources conservation warden’s acts were “functionally equivalent to that 
of any private citizen reporting to the police the details of an alleged criminal act”); United States v. Lima, 424 
A.2d 113, 118 (D.C. 1980) (en banc); cf. United States v. McDougald, 350 A.2d 375, 378 (D.C. 1976) (noting 
“[t]he power of arrest . . . is the sole factor which distinguishes the holder of a special police commission from 
a private citizen,” but distinguishing the special officer at issue as being motivated by private interests). See 
generally WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 2:4 (2012). However, 
while the Shomrim are not deputized, such a finding is not necessary for state action to exist. For instance, 
other considerations such as continuing ties to the police may be sufficient to show state action. See id. (noting 
that a private citizen’s actions in conjunction with police may be construed as state action for purposes of a 
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 280 481 F.3d 591, 599 (8th Cir. 2007).  
 281 See supra Part I.B.  
 282 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.8 (5th 
ed. 2012).  
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Further, when officers make arrests at the behest of private citizens, the lack of 
an independent evaluation may render the private citizens state actors.283 The 
NYPD acknowledges the Shomrim’s propensity to respond immediately to 
calls or situations, rather than calling and waiting on the police.284 Although 
the extent of the police’s independent investigation is unknown, it seems 
highly plausible that the NYPD knowingly acquiesces to the Shomrim’s 
exclusionary actions. 
One criminal procedure scholar has suggested certain features of private 
police that, when performed, ought to subject them to “the commands of the 
Fourth Amendment.”285 These features include when private police “actually 
supplant the public police,” “deal regularly with the general public,” and have 
an interest in criminal convictions.286 The Shomrim are certainly interested in 
criminal convictions of the criminals they catch. Additionally, as discussed in 
the previous section,287 their similar uniforms, cars, perceived authority, and 
work in connection to the police may indicate to an observer that they are an 
arm of the police.288 There is some indication that the Shomrim seem to 
impliedly supplant the NYPD in certain areas of Brooklyn,289 and they 
certainly deal daily with the public.290 Obtaining criminal convictions of those 
they find breaking the law is an objective; their actions are taken to catch 
criminals291 and they call the police to make arrests.292 Aiding their 
“employer” can only be said to be their community, and therefore the public. 
While the Shomrim arguably are pursuing private objectives—keeping 
 
 283 See Hernandez v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 673 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam) (holding that no state authority was conveyed to the private actor because the arresting police officer 
made an independent “determination of cause to arrest”).  
 284 Kilgannon, supra note 39. Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly stated a “‘longstanding issue with 
[the] Shomrim’” was their delay in police notification. Id. 
 285 See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 282, § 1.8. Another issue, beyond the scope of this Comment, is 
whether evidence obtained through private citizens working with the police should be subject to the 
exclusionary rule. See id.  
 286 Id. The California Supreme Court has held private police to be state actors subject to constitutional 
limitations due to the “increasing reliance placed upon private security personnel by local law enforcement 
authorities.” People v. Zelinski, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005 (Cal. 1979) (in bank). 
 287 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 288 See supra Part I.  
 289 See, e.g., Heilman, supra note 217 (quoting a commander at the 66th precinct as saying “‘I look at the 
Shomrim like they’re the NYPD’”).  
 290 See supra Part I. 
 291 Cf. Kilgannon, supra note 39. 
 292 For a running count of the Shomrim’s work catching “perps,” see for example, YESHIVA WORLD 
NEWS, http://www.boroparkscoop.com (last visited June 18, 2013).  
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outsiders from their midst—they are, at the same time, aiding in catching and 
convicting criminals. 
B. An Infringement on Substantive Rights Makes State Action More Likely 
State action is even more likely to be found where, as here, the case 
involves racial discrimination. While this is not the stated law, it is argued in 
many dissents and scholarly articles. Finding state action may in part depend 
on a differential analysis for the varying substantive rights.293 Many 
commentators have alleged that the finding of state action is “inextricably 
linked to the Court’s view as to whether there is a violation of equal 
protection.”294 Under a substantive rights approach to state action, competing 
constitutional values are leveled against one another to weigh which is more 
important.295 A weighing of competing values also may aid in explaining why 
in some situations state action is found where, for example, a person is 
employed directly by the state and vice versa.296 
This substantive rights approach is echoed in the courts as well. Judge 
Friendly of the Second Circuit advocated consideration of a litigant’s 
substantive rights in a state action analysis.297 While much of this may be an 
implicit consideration,298 there is a clear “tendency of reviewing courts to 
apply different standards of analysis depending upon the nature of the 
Constitutional right involved.”299 A handful of Supreme Court dissents have 
acknowledged the role the varying substantive interests play in the state action 
analysis.300 Many lower federal courts actively embrace this substantive rights 
analysis.301 This suggests that, if litigated, a challenge to the Shomrim would 
 
 293 See, e.g., Jody Young Jakosa, Parsing Public from Private: The Failure of Differential State Action 
Analysis, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 193, 208 (1984) (providing a hierarchy of state action standards).  
 294 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141, at 538. 
 295 See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role of 
Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 110 (2004). 
 296 See id. at 111. Wells additionally argued that ignoring substance leads to the confusing state action 
tests. Id. at 111–12.  
 297 Henry J. Friendly, The Public–Private Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 
1291 (1982).  
 298 See Wells, supra note 295, at 107 (“[T]he modern view distinguishing between state action and the 
substantive merits has become entrenched . . . . All the Justices seem to take it for granted.”). 
 299 Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public–
Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 203, 215 (2001). 
 300 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373–74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190–91 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 301 Jakosa, supra note 293, at 194–97.  
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be more likely to win because the claims involve the Equal Protection Clause 
and discrimination. The substantive right of equal protection outweighs the 
Shomrim’s right to government funding. 
The strongest application of the substantive rights approach is 
demonstrated in the courts’ approach to racial discrimination and the First 
Amendment. The level of government activity required to find state action 
appears to be less in these cases.302 Many scholars have asserted that cases 
where the Supreme Court did not find state action would have had a different 
outcome had there been a stronger substantive right at play. The confusing case 
of Shelley v. Kraemer is one case where many consider the discriminatory 
effect to have been the dispositive factor in finding state action.303 In the case 
of government subsidies, state action is most likely to be found when the 
“government’s purpose is to undermine the protection of constitutional 
rights.”304 Often, the analysis focuses on whether there is truly any real harm 
done discriminatorily.305 
In the case of the Shomrim, under a substantive rights approach the fact 
that they discriminate renders a finding of state action more likely. It is the 
specific situation giving rise to discriminatory actions that compels state action 
where it might otherwise not be found. Using a substantive rights approach 
may be especially imperative given the complexities and confusion 
surrounding the state action doctrine. Substantive rights may serve to ensure 
that the most egregious violations are addressed. 
C. Privatization and the Perverse Incentives of State Action 
The substantive rights approach aids in deciding when government should 
be held accountable and where the line between public and private conduct 
lies. This line between privatization and government conduct and, therefore, 
 
 302 See Kennedy, supra note 299, at 215 n.78. Many scholars have also posited that the state action 
doctrine was used during the Civil Rights Era when Congress was unable to enforce civil rights legislation. 
Thus, state action provided a useful tool. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 
CONST. COMMENT. 409, 413 (1993).  
 303 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). Many commentators cited the substantive-rights approach to explain the limited 
application of Shelley. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 302, at 409, 413. Chemerinsky provided two case 
examples of state action where the government gave aid with the intent of undermining school desegregation. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141, at 536 (citing Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568−69 (1974); 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 464−65 (1973)). 
 304 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 141, at 536.  
 305 See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 175, § 16.3 (asserting the analysis in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. 
Irvis focused on whether any real harm was done discriminatorily).  
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where constitutional liability begins and ends, is especially blurred in an era of 
greater privatization.306 Not only is it increasingly challenging to discern where 
the line between private action and state action is drawn, but also criticism of 
the failings of the state action doctrine to address privatization abounds.307 
Privatization frequently removes what was formerly, or should be, government 
programs and activities from constitutional scrutiny, as “few instances of 
privatization are likely to trigger a finding of state action.”308 Particularly 
problematic is when government power, exercised by private actors, allows the 
private actors to then control third parties because of the government’s 
allocation of power.309 
The Shomrim highlight this problem by serving as an example of 
privatization that does trigger state action. Finding state action here is 
especially important because otherwise, the Shomrim’s discriminatory actions 
are not only shielded from constitutional scrutiny, but also largely from the 
political process, tort law, and criminal law.310 The Shomrim’s allocation of 
government power allows them to control third parties, yet it is insulated from 
challenges. 
Application of the substantive rights approach may be especially 
imperative when considering what Gillian Metzger termed the “perverse 
incentives” of state action.311 The state action doctrine is both under- and over-
inclusive, and it is ultimately a “poor vehicle” with which to preserve 
government accountability.312 State action is over-inclusive because it 
unnecessarily restricts a government’s ability to flexibly use available 
resources when it applies constitutional constraints on private action that 
exercises government power that is otherwise properly constrained.313 
Conversely, state action is under-inclusive because it fails to take account of 
the many instances of privatization that erroneously escape the ill-defined 
confines of state action.314 Overall, this creates perverse incentives for the 
 
 306 See generally Metzger, supra note 22. Metzger argued that “[p]rivate involvement in government is 
addressed primarily through the state action doctrine, which inquires whether, in a particular context, 
ostensibly private parties should be considered ‘state (or federal) actors.’” Id. at 1370.  
 307 See, e.g., id. 
 308 Id. at 1375. 
 309 Id. 
 310 See supra Part I.E. 
 311 Metzger, supra note 22, at 1371. 
 312 Id. at 1375. 
 313 Id.  
 314 See id.  
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government to allocate private partners “broad discretion over government 
programs,” minimizing government involvement and further endangering the 
threat privatization poses to constitutional accountability.315 
The line between public and private is further blurred when, like the 
Shomrim, state actors are also religious actors. The next Part discusses the 
constitutional issues implicated in religious state action and explores possible 
solutions to the Shomrim. 
IV.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS STATE ACTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
GRAY AREA 
Thus far, this Comment establishes that the Shomrim are state actors under 
the Constitution. As state actors, the Shomrim will be held liable for 
discriminatory conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment. While treating the 
Shomrim as state actors provides the strongest constitutional argument, this 
does not necessarily render the best solution. 
First, this Part goes through some possible solutions to the problem 
presented by the Shomrim. Such an exercise demonstrates constitutional gray 
areas and discovers that the only constitutionally permissible solution is to 
defund the Shomrim and remove their ties to the state. This constitutional gray 
area should serve as an indication of the problems inherent in funding insular 
groups and organizations like the Shomrim. Because these groups aim to 
operate around their own private interest, they run an inherent risk of 
discrimination against the outside community. Privatizing such organizations 
should be inherently suspect. This Part concludes by asserting that in these 
situations, the best policy is for the government to keep its hands and money 
away. 
A. Possible Solutions to the Shomrim Problem 
As state actors, the Shomrim would be subject to liability for their 
constitutional torts or violations of constitutional rights.316 For instance, 
minorities unfairly pursued and beaten by the Shomrim could sue under 28 
 
 315 Id.  
 316 A constitutional tort is an “action[] brought against government[] [and those fairly said to be 
government actors] . . . seeking damages for the violation of federal constitutional rights, particularly those 
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights.” SHELDON H. NAHMOD, MICHAEL L. WELLS 
& THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 1 (3d ed. 2009).  
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U.S.C. § 1983 for infringing on their individual rights protected under the 
Constitution.317 The Shomrim would be liable for damages and equitable relief, 
such as declaratory relief or an injunction ordering them to stop. Additionally, 
the government might be open to liability for the Shomrim’s actions.318 
Applying constitutional norms solves the problem of discrimination; however, 
it would come at a significant cost.319 Holding private entities to constitutional 
norms obstructs their autonomous nature at large, as well as individually 
because the entity may be subject to the government’s regulatory 
prerogatives.320 Determining who is subject to constitutional norms is an 
additional concern because it arguably raises a separation of powers problem, 
where the judiciary decides who is acting as a part of the government.321 
Extension of constitutional constraints on the Shomrim also intrudes on the 
government’s ability to utilize useful private agents providing social 
services.322 
While classification as a state actor would extend constitutional 
requirements to the Shomrim, the government would be unlikely to leave the 
Shomrim as they are. First, the possibility of a lawsuit and liability323 for the 
government would be too great to ignore. Second, the public outrage over an 
arm of the state policing in such a discriminatory fashion would likely compel 
the government to either regulate the Shomrim or remove the state from the 
state action. The following paragraphs consider these solutions. 
One solution might be for the government to institute regulations or 
monitoring to limit liability for the Shomrim’s unconstitutional actions. 
However, further regulation might result in an Establishment Clause violation. 
As the Shomrim currently operate, it is not clear there is an Establishment 
Clause violation.324 Additional regulations and potentially “pervasive” 
monitoring might result in excessive entanglement reaching a constitutionally 
impermissible level.325 While the Shomrim, the NYPD, and the state are 
 
 317 A plaintiff would probably sue for violations under the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Due 
Process Clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 318 The plaintiff would likely argue the Shomrim were acting pursuant to the government’s policy or 
custom, also under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.  
 319 Metzger, supra note 22, at 1406. 
 320 Id. at 1406–07.  
 321 Id. at 1407–08.  
 322 See id. at 1427. 
 323 See supra notes 306–07 and accompanying text.  
 324 See supra Part II.  
 325 See supra Part II; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 794 (2000).  
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already closely entwined and work together, further regulations would provide 
even more government endorsement of their discriminatory actions.326 Further, 
it is also possible that such regulation would raise concerns regarding the 
infringement on the free exercise of religion,327 as government intrusion via 
regulations and monitoring “threatens religious autonomy.”328 A regulation 
may unduly restrict exercise of what the Hasidim consider part of their 
religion. This is further compounded by the fact that the courts are not free to 
define religion.329 Therefore, further regulation and monitoring might 
exacerbate the constitutional problem rather than fix it. 
If unable to regulate the Shomrim, the government would likely remove its 
presence and funding because it would be exposed to liability. This removes 
the “state” from state action and remedies the Establishment Clause problem 
by withdrawing funding. The government would take away at least some 
funding330 and halt the close relationships the Shomrim have formed with the 
local police and local legislators. While defunding and cutting some of the ties 
with the state would no longer render the Shomrim subject to constitutional 
limitations, they also may not be able to function effectively. The Shomrim 
rely almost entirely on government funds, and it may prove impossible to 
privately provide the funds necessary to continue.331 This is unfortunate 
because, other than their discriminatory actions, the Shomrim provide a 
valuable service to their community. Although defunding and removing the 
ties with the state is a dismal conclusion, it appears to be the only 
constitutionally permissible solution. 
B. The Problem of Privatization of Inherently Religious Organizations 
Ultimately, the Shomrim demonstrate the inability of the Constitution to 
adequately address the problems posed by privatized social services provided 
 
 326 Cf. Kennedy, supra note 299, at 218 (suggesting contract monitoring in charitable choice religious 
social services might amount to “entanglement” under the Establishment Clause).  
 327 “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 328 Saperstein, supra note 15, at 1366–67.  
 329 See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 136–42 
(2006). However, the free exercise argument may not be as large a hurdle, as there might be a compelling 
purpose to the law.  
 330 One could argue that indirect funding, rather than direct funding, could lessen the problem; however, 
logistically it is unclear how one could indirectly fund the Shomrim or make the funding resultant from 
individual choice. While prison vouchers seem plausible, see, e.g., Volokh, supra note 123, at 988, police 
vouchers might be a little far-fetched.  
 331 Cf. Fernanda Santos, Reverberations of a Baby Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, § 1, at 23 (noting 
that 62% of families live below the poverty line in Kiryas Joel, a Hasidic enclave). 
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by inherently religious organizations. In these cases, the government must be 
especially careful in how it decides to fund and work with religious social 
services. Not all government funded religious actors are state actors. However, 
in an age of increased privatization of religion through the use of government 
funds, state action—along with the substantive-rights approach—is necessary 
to identify instances of discrimination. State action may provide an important 
vehicle to keep these organizations in check and give proper accordance to 
constitutional rights. 
The previous section highlights the constitutional gray area resulting from 
the privatization of religious social services. In any formulation where the 
government is involved, a constitutional problem arises. In the tense realm 
between the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the state 
action doctrine, attempting to remedy constitutional issues serves to further 
exacerbate the constitutional problem. 
In addition to the Shomrim, a striking example of this is the debate over 
whether religious organizations funded by the government have the right to 
discriminate in hiring.332 While the employment discrimination discussion is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, it serves as another demonstration of the 
tensions between the constitutional doctrines that result from government 
funding of inherently religious organizations. The murky waters of this 
constitutional gray area should serve as an indication of the problems in 
privatizing the services of inherently religious organizations. The government 
should be extremely careful in funding and working with these organizations. 
As set forth in the beginning of this Comment, commentators have 
suggested that insular or inherently religious groups may be more likely to 
discriminate against outsiders.333 In previous eras, the Supreme Court has been 
 
 332 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Emp’t Div. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See generally 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 329. 
 333 See supra Intro. This argument may be extended to other common interest, but nonreligious, 
communities. For example, in gated communities, where residential associations are “fraught with potential for 
discrimination on the basis of race and class.” David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State 
Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 768 (1995). Not 
only are streets privatized through judicial means, but also these communities frequently use security guards or 
private police. Id. at 771. Similar to the Shomrim policing Hasidic communities, “[a] black person who shows 
up in one of these places is likely to get busted” by the private police employed by the communities to keep 
them out. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Scholars argue that residential 
associations may be transformed into state actors because they receive and utilize public resources, serve a 
public function, and have an interdependent relationship with local governments. See id. at 783–84; see also 
STERNLIEB GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/26/2013  11:49 AM 
1456 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1411 
extremely wary of allowing the funding of “pervasively sectarian” 
organizations because of their inability to separate and pursue strictly secular 
goals. As one scholar asserted, “Discriminatory practices have been considered 
indicia of a pervasively sectarian environment.”334 It is the “inherent religious 
mission and culture” of these insular, inward-looking, and pervasively 
sectarian institutions that exerts great pressure to discriminate.335 To ensure 
compliance with government regulations, these groups thus require extensive 
monitoring. However, this in itself carries a “catch-22” of entanglement with 
religion and “threatens religious autonomy.”336 
Consider the social or cultural implication of privatization: “an individual’s 
withdrawal from civic life and reorientation towards the pursuit of self-
interest.”337 The Shomrim, along with other insular or pervasively sectarian 
communities, remove themselves from the public world and reorient toward 
their own pursuits.338 Privatization in the context of the government, however, 
implies the transfer of public power, money, and responsibilities to private 
hands.339 It should be suspect for the government to employ privatization to 
transfer public power to organizations that are oriented around their own self-
interest, especially given an increased likelihood of discrimination. As 
Professor Kent Greenawalt warned, these religious organizations may “use 
government to promote their religion by excluding outsiders.”340 The Shomrim 
demonstrate the particular concern in religious privatization of the danger “of 
turning vulnerable client populations over to well-meaning ministries arguably 
unconstrained by the Fourteenth Amendment.”341 
 
Angel M. Traub, Comment, The Wall Is Down, Now We Build More: The Exclusionary Effects of Gated 
Communities Demand Stricter Burdens Under the FHA, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 379, 393–94 & n.91 (2000). 
 334 Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 1, 47 (2002).  
 335 Saperstein, supra note 15, at 1366.  
 336 Id. at 1366–67.  
 337 Metzger, supra note 22, at 1377. 
 338 Recent spotlight from the media may make it especially imperative to further examine the Shomrim’s 
actions. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7; Jen Chung, Photos: Liev Schreiber as Williamsburg Shomrim Officer, 
Woody Allen as a Pimp, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 13, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://gothamist.com/2012/11/13/photos_liev_ 
schreiber_as_williamsbu.php#photo-1 (showing Liev Schreiber playing a Brookyln Shomrim officer).  
 339 Metzger, supra note 22, at 1377.  
 340 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 234.  
 341 Kennedy, supra note 299, at 217.  
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CONCLUSION 
The disconcerting issue of discrimination by government-funded, 
inherently religious organizations is a difficult constitutional question. While 
government funding of religious organizations and social services has been 
hotly debated in the past decade, the issue of discrimination by these 
organizations has received limited attention. Constitutionally, if these religious 
organizations are private actors they may be free to discriminate. However, 
when contacts with the state, along with public money transform religious 
organizations into state actors, they must act in accordance with the 
Constitution. Attempts to remedy the problem demonstrate there is no easy 
solution. 
Thus, this Comment ties together a variety of arguments and research—the 
propensity for discrimination by insular or inherently religious communities, 
the increase in government privatization, and funding of religious social 
service providers—to suggest there is a danger in government privatization of 
insular religious organizations. It should be viewed as inherently suspect for 
the government to become involved with such exclusive communities. Using 
the Shomrim, this novel application of the Establishment Clause and the state 
action doctrine demonstrates the constitutional gray areas that may result from 
the privatization of insular religious communities. Going forward, the 
Shomrim problem teaches that these constitutional gray areas indicate an area 
where government is not meant to go. 
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